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1 Introduction
Do distributional orderings have the right shape? The question is rele-
vant for several elds of economic analysis including individual choice under
risk and the evaluation of inequality. At its heart is a fundamental axiom
of distributional analysis concerning mean-preserving spreads. The axiom is
fundamental in two senses: rst, it is commonly applied to a broad range
of problems concerning distributional comparisons, irrespective of context;
second, a version of it is often regarded as essential in characterising risk and
inequality measures. In this paper we investigate whether this fundamental
axiom is really appropriate. Using a questionnaire experiment in seven dif-
ferent distributional contexts the seven avoursof the title we examine
the way that people appear to compare distributions in practice.
The variety of contexts include not only risk and inequality comparisons
but also comparisons explicitly in terms of welfare. In fact the welfare
interpretation forms a particularly useful starting point, since it is capable
of being expressed in one of two ways: (1) as social-welfare evaluations of
income distributions and (2) as personal-preference evaluations of probability
distributions over income. Orthodox economic theory makes a simple link
between these welfare interpretations and inequality and risk evaluations
respectively.
To address the question that we raised at the start, this paper focuses on
two central features of welfare economics as applied to income distributions.
First, is the implied shape of the contours used in peoples distributional
comparisons independent of economic context? Second, is the essence of the
fundamental principle that these contours should respect mean-preserving
spreads consistently observed?
The approach adopted here enables us to focus in a unique way on a num-
ber of issues that may a¤ect the nature of distributional comparisons. For
example, although theory is often predicated on the assumption that certain
distributional values should be independent of personal circumstances, we
might in practice expect to see di¤erent judgments if the person perceives
that there is some personal involvement in the distributional choice. Fur-
thermore, although in the standard theory distributional judgments should
be free of the context it would be interesting to know if, in fact, the avour
of the problem has a signicant e¤ect.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the welfare-economic
background; sections 3 and 4 respectively explain the methodology of the
paper and analyse the results; section 5 concludes.
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2 Welfare orderings and risk orderings
We have deliberately set out to cover a number of distributional principles
simultaneously: let us begin with risk. The nature of risk comparisons de-
veloped in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) is founded upon the well-known
concept of the mean-preserving spread (MPS)  any change in the distri-
bution that can be represented as a sequence of MPSs must represent an
increase in risk. This concept is intended to apply both to risks in which an
agent is personally involved and that thus may form the basis for individual
behaviour, and also to risks that do not involve the decision-maker.
There is a well-known counterpart to the MPS principle in the welfare
analysis of income distributions, namely the transfer principle. The view that
income disparities are socially undesirable goes back at least as far as Plato.
However the explicit formalisation of the transfer principle is comparatively
recent. Pigou (1912) formulated the principle in the context of just two
persons, but was doubtful about extending it to other cases:
...economic welfare is likely to be augmented by anything that,
leaving other things unaltered, renders the distribution of the
national dividend less unequal. If we assume all members of the
community to be of similar temperament, and if these members
are only two in number, it is easily shown that any transference
from the richer to the poorer of the two, since it enables more
intense wants to be satised at the expense of less intense wants,
must increase the aggregate sum of satisfaction. In a community
consisting of more than two members, the meaning of rendering
the distribution of the dividend less unequalis ambiguous.(pp.
24-25).
An important step, reformulating the principle for an n-person society,
was taken by Dalton (1920):
...we may safely say that, if there are only two income-receivers,
and a transfer of incomes takes place from the richer to the poorer,
inequality is diminished [...] we may safely go farther and say
that, however great the number of income-receivers and whatever,
the amount of their incomes, any transfer between any two of
them, or, in general, any series of such transfers, [...] will diminish
inequality. page 351.
This is the concept that was developed by Atkinson (1970), Kolm (1969)
and many other modern writers. The Dalton concept is the principle which
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permits the application of standard dominance criteria to be applied to the
analysis of income distribution. It is embodied in the concept of S-concavity
(Dasgupta et al. 1973, Sen and Foster 1997) and standard interpretations of
majorisation (Marshall and Olkin 1979). But the concept clearly rests upon
a specic interpretation of fundamental distributional principles that may,
perhaps, be overly strong.1
The wording of Pigous discussion clearly expresses social welfare in terms
of sums of individual utilities and appeals to diminishing individual marginal
utility as a basis for a social preference for greater equality. Such a view might
not command much support today were it not buttressed by additional argu-
ment.2 The additional argument for the sum-of-utilities approach to social
welfare might be sought in the form of appealing to concern for inequality
as a kind of consumption externality; this is clearly an approach for which
there is no close counterpart in terms of individual choice under uncertainty.
However, an alternative approach to the sum-of-utilities can be found in the
connection between inequality and risk analysis. This connection was at the
heart of Atkinson (1970)s approach who pointed out a natural a¢ nity be-
tween aversion to risk and aversion to inequality but there is an important
further argument based on individual choices in the face of risk. Harsanyi, in
a number of contributions (1953, 1955, 1977, 1978) made the case for consid-
ering social choice amongst income distributions as a reection of individual
choice amongst lotteries: this argument has been expressed either in the
form of an impartial outside observer of society or that of personal involve-
ment in that the individual decision-maker is supposed to imagine extending
his preferences to social choice by imagining himself as being, with equal
probability, in the situation of any of the n members of society.3
A further argument for social concern with inequality can be based on
Rawls (1971)s approach to distributional justice. This explicitly uses the
concept of a veil of ignorancebehind which an individual is imagined to
make judgments about alternative states of the society of which he is sup-
posed to be member. We thus have a collection of six alternative avours
of a fundamental distributional issue, as illustrated in the rst three rows of
Table 1: do MPSs increase risk, increase inequality, lower social welfare, cre-
ate a more unjust state of society? These avours collectively form the basis
1For example, a less demanding and relatively under-exploited concept is that of dom-
inance in terms of di¤erentials see Marshall and Olkin (1979) pp.275-276 for a general
treatment, Moyes (1994) and Bosmans (2007) in the context of inequality and Quiggin
(1991) in the context of risk.
2For a summary of alternative approaches see Moulin (2003), Chapter 2.
3We have dicussed the detailed issues raised by the Harsanyi approach in Amiel et al.
(2006).
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negative formulation positive formulation
risk; non-involvement Harsanyi welfare; non-involvement
risk; involvement Harsanyi welfare; involvement
inequality Rawlsian justice
fairness
Table 1: Flavours of the distributional problem
for our investigation into distributional attitudes below. However, there may
be other reasons which drive peoples concern about income distributions;
to allow for this we have introduced a seventh avour under the vague term
fairnessfor which we do not attempt to give a precise denition.
3 The Approach
The issue was investigated by using a questionnaire-experiment with student
respondents using the method described in full in Amiel and Cowell (1999,
2007). The special feature of the current study was the simultaneous presen-
tation of several distinct variants of the basic welfare-economic issue within
the same questionnaire-experimental format.
3.1 The questionnaires
Seven types of questionnaire the seven avours were distributed in con-
trolled sessions with student respondents during lecture or class time in 2003;
within each session the seven avours of questionnaire were distributed ran-
domly. The questionnaire types were similar to each other in most respects
but di¤ered in one key feature as explained below.
As in Amiel and Cowell (2007) respondents were invited to consider dis-
tributional judgments in a mythical country, Alfaland. Alfaland consists of
ve regions that may di¤er from each other in terms of living standards (in-
come) but that are internally homogeneous in terms of income. The realised
incomes in each region of Alfaland depend on which of two policies A or B
is pursued in the near future. Respondents are rst asked to compare the
distributional outcomes across the regions of Alfaland in each of six scenarios
represented by pairs of income-vector; in each pair there is a distributional
outcome from the A policy and an outcome from the B policy. Respondents
are asked In each of questions (1) to (6) two alternative lists of incomes A
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and B (in Alfaland local currency) are given. Each of these pairs represents
the outcomes of the A-policy and the B-policy on the ve regions in each of
six di¤erent situations in which Alfaland might nd itself next year. In each
case please state which policy you consider XXX by circling A or B.The
symbol XXX stands for wording that is specic to each of the seven avours
as follows:
1. (Ineq) ...would result in higher inequality in Alfaland.
2. (Risk) ...would result in higher risk for a person immigrating to Alfa-
land.
3. (Risk-i) ...would result in higher risk for you as an immigrant to Al-
faland.
4. (Hars) would result in a better situation in Alfaland. To create a
sharp distinction between this and the next avour respondents here
were also told Imagine that you are invited to be an outside observer
of Alfaland...
5. (Hars-i) ...would result in a better situation in Alfaland.In contrast
to the avour Hars respondents were told Imagine that you have been
assigned to one of the regions in Alfaland with an equal chance of being
in any one of the ve regions.
6. (Just) ...as more just for Alfaland.In contrast to the avours Hars
and Hars-i respondents here were told Imagine that you have been
assigned to one of the regions in Alfaland, but you do not know which
one.This captures the idea of the veil-of-ignorance approach of Rawls
(1971).
7. (Fair) ...would result in a fairer situation in Alfaland.
The respondents are also told that they can indicate indi¤erence between
the two outcomes by circling both A and B. Thus seven types of questionnaire
were created from one. In each questionnaire the pattern of numerical ques-
tions was exactly the same as depicted in Figure 1. Clearly the A vectors can
always be obtained from the B-vectors by a MPS (in other words a disequal-
ising transfer). This means that for Ineq, Risk and Risk-i a person answering
in line with orthodoxy would check A, whereas for the other four avours the
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orthodox response is B.4 Note that the questionnaire makes no implication
about the status quo; nevertheless, in considering the implications of the dis-
tributional comparisons in the six separate scenarios, it is interesting to note
the implied transfer in each pair of distributions. If we were to interpret
A and B as Afterand Before: in two cases (questions 4 and 5) this in-
volves relatively large amounts; in one case (question 2) this involves a small
amount from poorest to richest; in one case (question 3) a small transfer to
the richest, but not from the poorest; and in two cases (questions 1 and 6)
small transfers involving neither the poorest nor the richest. Question 4 is
slightly di¤erent from the others in that the implied transfer involves a
reordering.5
Figure 1: The structure of the numerical questions
The numerical questions were then followed by a verbal question, de-
scribed more fully below and an invitation to indicate any changes of mind
about the responses to the numerical questions after having considered the
principles stated in the verbal question. Of course for each of the seven
avours the precise wording of the verbal question had to be modied to cor-
4Notice that, strictly speaking, this applies also in the case of risk if the principle of
mean-preserving spreads is satised. The risk in A is unambiguously higher than the risk
in B irrespective of whether a person cares about that risk whether a person is risk
averse or not.
5In previous work with a similar format we checked whether the order of the scenarios
or the order of presentation of the A and B vectors matter; they do not. (Amiel and
Cowell 1999 p143)
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Germany Israel UK All countries
Ineq 47 52 44 143
Risk 48 52 40 140
Risk-i 44 51 47 142
Hars 48 50 43 141
Hars-i 52 53 44 149
Just 52 54 45 151
Fair 53 50 46 149
All avours 344 362 309 1015
Table 2: Sample of respondents
respond with phrasing used in the introduction. There was then a short list
of questions covering personal details; however, as noted in the introduction
to the questionnaire, each questionnaire-experimental session was run anony-
mously. Two examples of the seven avours of questionnaire are provided in
Appendix A.
3.2 The respondents
The seven avours of questionnaire-experiment were run simultaneously with
each of three groups of undergraduate students in Germany (Universität
Osnabrück), Israel (Ruppin Academic Center) and the UK (London School of
Economics). The breakdown is as in Table 2 where it is clear that our goal of
distributing the seven avours in roughly equal proportions in each subgroup
of respondents was achieved. Also the one thousand-odd respondents were
spread fairly evenly among the three countries.
4 Results
4.1 Numerical questions: overview
The overall results are depicted in Table 3. The leading column again gives
the di¤erent avours of the questionnaires. The columns labelled Q1 to Q6
give the proportions of orthodox responses to each of the six numerical ques-
tions for each avour of the questionnaire and the column labelled joint
Q1-Q6gives the proportion of the respondents who gave the orthodox re-
sponse to all six questions jointly.
Recall that in all seven avours full support for the orthodox position
would imply 100% for all of Q1,...,Q6 and, of course, for the joint Q1-Q6 as
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 joint Q1-Q6
Ineq 37.8% 71.3% 59.4% 57.3% 73.4% 46.2% 14.7%
Risk 41.4% 57.9% 57.1% 56.4% 57.9% 48.6% 14.3%
Risk-i 41.5% 54.9% 50.7% 47.2% 56.3% 42.3% 12.0%
Hars 58.9% 80.9% 72.3% 61.0% 80.9% 56.0% 26.2%
Hars-i 55.0% 78.5% 65.8% 57.0% 76.5% 53.7% 24.8%
Just 60.9% 89.4% 78.8% 62.9% 77.5% 76.2% 32.5%
Fair 51.7% 83.9% 71.8% 61.1% 74.5% 58.4% 26.2%
All 49.8% 74.1% 65.3% 57.7% 71.2% 54.7% 21.7%
Table 3: Proportion of orthodox responses in the whole sample
well; it is striking that support for the orthodox position is so low from 12 %
to under 33%, according to avour.6 Now consider the pattern of responses,
question by question. The relatively high degree of conformity with orthodox
views in the case of question 2 (column Q2) is not, perhaps, a surprise. This
involves an implied transfer between richest and poorest. Even in the case
of risk these usually command a greater degree of support than is implied
by the responses to the other numerical questions, although it is much lower
than on other avours. Also note that across all the avour patterns there
is usually much less support for the orthodox position in the case where the
implied transfer is small and does not involve either the richest or the poorest
region (questions 1 and 6) a common-sense result that applies for all the
6The results corroborate the outcomes in previous studies run on di¤erent samples. For
example the question-by-question ordering of inequality and risk in Table 3 is the same
as in Amiel and Cowell (2002); the size of the percentage value of orthodox responses
for inequality and for risk is also similar to that in Amiel and Cowell (2002). Also the
rank order of orthodox percentages on Hars, question by question is the same as for the
preference-under-uncertainty question in Amiel and Cowell (2007).
It might be argued that the criterion of getting all six answers in line with orthodox
view is overly demanding. If one allows for simple mistakes by the respondent it might be
reasonable to consider at least ve out of sixas an indication of an orthodox response.
Allowing for near misses modies the results in the last column of Table 3 as follows:
"exact" "near miss" "exact" "near miss"
Ineq 14.7% 31.5% Hars 26.2% 48.9%
Risk 14.3% 32.9% Hars-i 24.8% 45.6%
Risk-i 12.0% 26.8% Just 32.5% 55.6%
Fair 26.2% 43.0%
Clearly allowing for one mistake slightly more than doubles the proportion of ortho-
doxresponses for negative-worded avours (left-hand side of table) and slightly less than
doubles it for positive-worded avours (right-hand side). But only in one case, Just, does
the proportion of orthodox responses exceed 50 percent, even allowing for near-misses.
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avours.7
The fact that support for the fundamental distributional principle appears
to di¤er according to where implied transfer occurs could be taken as a simple
example of the imp;ortance of context. However, the ne detail of our results
reveal two further important context e¤ects according to avour. In fact
it is worth distinguishing two major avour categories:
 First, where the story-context in the questionnaire focuses on some-
thing that is desirable (welfare, justice, fairness) rather than undesir-
able (inequality, risk). This issue is discussed in section 4.2
 Second, where the story-context in the questionnaire focuses on a sup-
posed involvement of the respondent in the distributional comparison,
in contrast to a position of Olympian detachment see section 4.3.
Other features of context e¤ects for example, personal characteristics
of respondents are also briey considered in section 4.3.
4.2 Flavour category 1: positive versus negative
If we compare the rst three rows of Table 3 with the next four it is clear
that there is a marked di¤erence in orthodox responses depending on whether
the avour concerned represents a positive or a negative statement of the
distributional issues; incidentally this is in sharp contrast with the results for
the verbal question examined in section 4.5 below.
It is evident from the bottom part of the Table that Fair elicits responses
that are very similar to Hars but that Just almost always elicits the highest
percentage of orthodox responses among all seven avours. As it happens
Just is also the avour with the smallest number of indi¤erence responses 
see Table 4: it may be that this is an intrinsically unambiguous concept that
does not leave much room for indi¤erence.
What makes the di¤erence between the two groups of avours in Ta-
ble 3? Although the rst group are all negativeavours and the second
group all positive avours, we should not conclude it is simply because
they are positive/negative that the contrasting response patterns arise: the
label positive just categorises those avours where the orthodox position
is BA (B should be circled) and for the negativegroup of avours the
7The case of question 5 (column Q5) is similar to that of question 2. Notice that a
distributional comparison that conforms to the principle of dominance in terms of di¤er-
entials (see note 1) would concur with the mean-preserving spread principle in the case of
Q2 and Q5, but not on the other questions.
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6
Ineq 143 37.8% 11.9% 16.8% 6.3% 5.6% 25.2%
Risk 140 36.4% 19.3% 19.3% 15.7% 15.0% 24.3%
Risk-i 142 32.4% 16.2% 19.7% 13.4% 17.6% 26.1%
Hars 141 25.5% 11.3% 12.1% 7.1% 9.2% 23.4%
Hars-i 149 28.2% 12.1% 14.1% 8.7% 9.4% 17.4%
Just 151 13.2% 4.6% 4.6% 4.0% 7.3% 7.9%
Fair 149 23.5% 6.7% 12.8% 7.4% 6.7% 14.1%
All 1015 28.0% 11.6% 14.1% 8.9% 10.0% 19.6%
Table 4: Proportion of indi¤erence responses in the whole sample
orthodox position requires that A should be circled. Table 4 suggests that
a clear-cut answer was more di¢ cult to give when the issue was couched in
terms of either inequality or risk. It is clear that for both risk avours (Risk
and Risk-i) the proportion of indi¤erent responses was much higher than for
any avour in the positivegroup (Hars, Hars-i, Just and Fair); this may
be because respondents are risk neutral or because they nd it harder to
make up their mind.8
4.3 Flavour category 2: Involvement
As we noted in the introduction a key issue concerning risk and certain
aspects of welfare is that of involvement  whether the person is invited
to place him/herself in the situation about which the judgment is made.
Taking the sample as a whole there appears to be greater conformity with
the orthodox position when there is no involvement implied in the wording of
the questionnaire. To see this compare row 2 with row 3 and row 4 with row
5 in Table 3 or compare rows 1 and 2 in Table 5 where the risk and welfare
responses have been aggregated together.9
8Further evidence on this is provided by the number of cases where respondents ab-
stained from giving a response. Although we did not provide an explicit option cannot
compare, individuals were free to leave particular (A, B) pairs unchecked and it is clear
that this non-response was not distributed uniformly across avours and questions as Ta-
ble 11 in Appendix C shows. The highest non-response rate by avour is Risk-i ; by
question the non-response rate is higher for the cases where neither the richest nor the
poorest region is involved in the implied transfer.
9Consider the proportion of respondents who replied in line with the orthodox position
on each of Q1,...,Q6. In the case of Welfare (rows 4 and 5 in Table 3) it is clear that there
is vector dominance of the non-involved compared to the involved case. In the case of risk
(rows 2 and 3) there is almostvector dominance (i.e. dominance with one exception).
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joint
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q1-Q6
All Respondents
Non-involved 281 50.2% 69.4% 64.8% 58.7% 69.4% 52.3% 20.3%
Involved 291 48.5% 67.0% 58.4% 52.2% 66.7% 48.1% 18.6%
Males
Non-involved 157 53.5% 73.9% 65.6% 61.1% 75.2% 59.9% 22.9%
Involved 153 47.1% 64.7% 61.4% 56.2% 72.5% 50.3% 20.3%
Females
Non-involved 115 47.0% 63.5% 64.3% 54.8% 63.5% 44.3% 18.3%
Involved 127 53.5% 70.1% 55.9% 48.0% 61.4% 45.7% 17.3%
Table 5: Orthodox responses: involvement versus non-involvement
Underlying this is a more complex pattern. It is also clear from Table 5
that males are more likely to conform to the orthodox position if the issue
is presented without involvement but that the situation regarding females
appears ambiguous. But if we conne our attention to risk alone then male
and female response proles are almost exactly opposed (see Table 12 in
Appendix C): males orthodoxwithout involvement, females orthodox
with involvement!10
4.4 Personal characteristics and orthodox distributional
rankings
Some of these issues come out clearly in a probit analysis of orthodox re-
sponses. Let i be the probability that a person responds in orthodox fash-
ion to question i and let  be the probability that the person responds in
orthodox fashion to all numerical questions simultaneously. We analysed the
marginal impact on the probability of an orthodox response of each of the
personal characteristic and of the various avours of the questionnaire. The
model used is given by
 = (b1x1 + b2y2 + :::+ bnxn) (1)
10It is also interesting to see how this issue of involvement breaks down by the various
country subsamples. Table 14 in Appendix C provides the details. For welfare Israeli males
and females are more likely to respond in orthodox fashion if the issue is with involvement;
but the opposite applies to German males, UK males and UK females. Furthermore UK
males respond in the same way for risk as for welfare: they are more likely to be orthodox
if the issue is without involvement.
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where  takes the value 1; :::; 6 or  for each of the separate regressions,
(x1; :::; xn) is a vector of personal or other characteristics , (b1; :::; bn) is a
vector of coe¢ cients and  is the normal distribution function.
For each of the regressions we report three di¤erent specications see
Tables 6 to 8. All three specications use the following variable denitions
 sex: equals 1 if reported male, 0 otherwise
 age: in years
 emp: 1 if employed before, 0 otherwise
 pol: self-rated political views on a seven-point scale from extreme left
(1) to extreme right (7)
 inc 10: self-rated income position of family looking back 10 years, on
a seven-point scale from extremely poor (1) to extremely rich (7).
 inc+10: self-rated prospective income position of self looking forward
10 years, coded as above.
 ukd, deutd: dummies for respondents from, respectively, UK and
Germany.
1 2 3 4 5 6 
sex 0.0630 0.1308 0.1925y 0.1880 0.1155 0.2103z 0.1019
age 0.0063 -0.0097 -0.0225 -0.0166 0.0012 -0.0140 0.0129
emp -0.1448 -0.1191 -0.0315 -0.1381 0.0013 -0.0835 0.0598
pol 0.0243 -0.0855y -0.0449 -0.0009 -0.0848y -0.0226 -0.0941z
ssecon 0.0589 0.2747z 0.0544 0.0234 0.1078 0.0307 -0.0084
inc 10 -0.0471 -0.0468 0.0349 -0.0048 0.0010 0.0070 -0.0013
inc+10 -0.0186 0.0374 -0.0474 0.0123 0.0185 0.0273 0.0379
negform -0.3862 -0.3841 -0.3720 -0.2860z -0.2671z -0.3407 0.9435
ukd -0.2478z -0.4373 -0.4345 -0.1894 -0.4056 -0.2259y -0.0883
deutd 0.0797 -0.1557 -0.0630 -0.0134 -0.0158 0.1371 0.2285
const 0.8118 1.9059 2.0326 1.8045 1.6043 1.1510 -1.9124
y signicant at 10% level; z signicant at 5% level; signicant at 1% level.
Table 6: Responses to numerical questions Specication I
In addition specications I and II (Tables 6 and 7) use the following
dummies:
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1 2 3 4 5 6 
sex 0.0569 0.1345 0.1993y 0.1694 0.1115 0.2088z 0.1006
age 0.0066 -0.0099 -0.0232 -0.0143 0.0010 -0.0151 0.0126
emp -0.1135 -0.0828 -0.0286 -0.1129 0.0262 -0.0682 0.0850
pol 0.0256 -0.0795y -0.0419 -0.0138 -0.0792y -0.0160 -0.0965z
ssbroad 0.0405 0.2219y -0.0665 0.1849 0.0693 -0.0752 -0.0705
inc 10 -0.0555 -0.0470 0.0361 -0.0093 -0.0018 0.0075 0.0010
inc+10 -0.0105 0.0373 -0.0418 0.0134 0.0207 0.0314 0.0380
negform -0.3949 -0.3764 -0.3596 -0.2991 -0.2636z -0.3427 0.9567
ukd -0.1995y -0.4225 -0.3774 -0.2079 -0.3633z -0.1554 -0.0599
deutd 0.1000 -0.1250 -0.0277 -0.0534 0.0068 0.1709 0.2529y
const 0.7899 1.8853 2.0635 1.7247 1.5922 1.1864 -1.8922
y signicant at 10% level; z signicant at 5% level; signicant at 1% level.
Table 7: Responses to numerical questions Specication II
 ssecon: takes the value 1 if students special subject is core eco-
nomicsas dened in the Appendix, 0 otherwise (specication I only)
 ssbroad: takes the value 1 if students special subject is broader
economics as dened in the Appendix, 0 otherwise (specication II
only)
 negform: takes the value 1 if questionnaire avour is Ineq, Risk or
Risk-i, 0 otherwise.
The reason for the focus on special subjects is that in previous studies we
have sometimes found that whether respondents had specialised in economics
had a signicant impact on the probability of their answering in conformity
with standard theory. It is clear that, with one exception, this not true
in the present case either for the core economics denition (Table 6) or for
the broad denition (Table 7). The exception noted above is clear if one
checks the coe¢ cient for the 2 regression in each case. In this case the
implied richest-to-poorest transfer is fairly obvious and so it is, perhaps, not
surprising that those with an economics speciality should pick up this point
more readily than others.
In the light of the apparent unimportance of the educational background
dummy, in specication III we drop it and replace the simple negform
dummy with avour-specic dummies ineq, risk, risk-i, hars, hars-i and
just.
One of the remarkable things that is evident in specication III is the role
of the avour dummies. In specications I and II it is clear that composite
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1 2 3 4 5 6 
sex 0.0537 0.1390 0.1963y 0.1746 0.1005 0.1926z 0.0974
age 0.0061 -0.0117 -0.0223 -0.0157 0.0013 -0.0143 0.0131
emp -0.1126 -0.0782 -0.0388 -0.1172 0.0146 -0.0620 0.0817
pol 0.0318 -0.0602 -0.0390 0.0043 -0.0731 -0.0138 -0.1034z
inc 10 -0.0603 -0.0528 0.0364 -0.0123 0.0007 0.0048 0.0075
inc+10 -0.0025 0.0439 -0.0371 0.0196 0.0203 0.0370 0.0301
ukd -0.1964y -0.3723 -0.4010 -0.1779 -0.3489z -0.1727 -0.0714
deutd 0.1133 -0.0578 -0.0385 0.0032 0.0175 0.1548 0.2309y
ineq -0.4088z -0.3369 -0.1848 0.1219 0.0834 -0.3900z 0.9612
risk -0.3943z -0.6587 -0.2979 -0.4072z -0.4721 -0.3642z 0.9449
risk-i -0.2775y -0.5165z -0.2936 -0.3053 -0.5730 -0.4048z 0.7548
hars -0.0589 -0.2813 0.0516 0.0703 -0.1553 -0.3222y 0.1032
hars-i -0.1314 -0.3333 -0.0603 -0.0478 -0.1755 -0.1100 -0.1003
just 0.3938z 0.1844 0.5535z 0.3472 -0.0596 0.3579y -0.3399
const 0.7527z 2.0986 1.8740 1.7026 1.7103 1.1479 -1.8379
y signicant at 10% level; z signicant at 5% level; signicant at 1% level.
Table 8: Responses to numerical questions Specication III
dummy negform is everywhere signicant being confronted with a negative
questionnaire that is phrased in terms of inequality or risk is more likely
to produce heterodox responses than one that is couched in the positive
language of welfare. However when one breaks out the e¤ect into separate
avours and drops the special-subject dummy it is clear that ineq, risk and
risk-i have their impact principally on 1 and 6 i.e. in the case of those
numerical problems where neither the richest nor the poorest is involved in
the transfer.
In each of the three specications it appears that sex plays a minor role:
On at least one question male respondents are more likely to respond in
conformity with the orthodox position. This corresponds with what was
found in Amiel and Cowell (2002) and corroborates the results presented in
Table 5. It is also clear that the ukd country dummy plays an important
role in decreasing the probability that an individual will respond in line with
economic orthodoxy.
4.5 Verbal question
The verbal question presented the underlying ordering principle precisely by
means of an example. Only the detail of the wording of the context di¤ered
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amongst the seven avours the substance of the question was the same in
all cases. Respondents were asked to think about a mean-preserving income
transfer from a richer region to a poorer region, other things being equal.
They were then invited to select from ve responses, as illustrated in Figure
2.
Figure 2: The alternatives in the verbal question (Risk avour)
An important point to note here is that the question explicitly allowed
for the possibility of multiple answers. The summary of results is depicted
in Table 9. The leading column again gives the various avours and the
columns labelled a to d give the proportions of the respondents who selected
the corresponding choice and no other. The rows sum to less than 100%
for three reasons: (1) responses in the category none of the aboveare not
reported; (2) not everyone provided an answer to this question; (3) people
sometimes selected more than one of the options and with one exception
these multiple choices are not reported. The exception is as follows. If one
were to observe the standard theory strictly then the appropriate response
should be d and nothing else. But apart from this strictly orthodox response
it may also be interesting to consider a fuzzy-orthodoxcase that allows for
the respondent to select something else as well as option d. The proportion
of respondents who do this is given in column d+.
It is clear that the level of agreement with the strict orthodox response d
is rather modest some 16 to 20 percent; relaxing the orthodox position to
the fuzzyversion raises the level of agreement by about another 4 percent-
age points. Among the single-choice responses there is an obvious winner.
Option b focuses just on the extreme incomes in the hypothesised redistribu-
tion and leaves open the impact of transfers not involving the extremes: this
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a b c d d+
Ineq 7.7% 30.8% 14.0% 19.6% 21.7%
Risk 10.0% 26.4% 0.0% 19.3% 25.0%
Risk-i 9.2% 24.8% 20.6% 19.9% 22.7%
Hars 13.5% 24.1% 20.6% 19.9% 26.2%
Hars-i 7.4% 28.9% 22.1% 16.1% 18.8%
Just 11.9% 28.5% 18.5% 20.5% 23.8%
Fair 18.1% 24.2% 16.1% 18.1% 22.8%
All 11.1% 26.8% 18.6% 19.0% 23.0%
Male 9.4% 29.2% 16.8% 19.4% 23.7%
Female 13.4% 24.4% 21.4% 19.2% 22.8%
Germany 10.5% 26.2% 25.0% 22.1% 25.9%
Israel 13.5% 28.7% 17.4% 18.5% 22.4%
UK 9.1% 25.2% 12.9% 16.2% 20.4%
Table 9: The verbal responses
distinction is crucial as we have seen from the numerical questions where it
was clear that responses were more likely to be orthodox if the richest or the
poorest region of Alfaland were involved. As is clear from column b of Table
9 support for this extremes option dominates that for options a, c or d.
It is evident from Table 9 that there is not much dispersion across the
avours in terms of the degree of support for the orthodox answer d, nor is
there any clear relationship between the involved and non-involved avours
of the study. There is very little di¤erence between males and females in
terms of the degree of support for the orthodox position in either strict or
fuzzy terms, but males are more likely to choose the extremes onlyb option.
However respondents in Germany tend to be more orthodox in their responses
than those in Israel who in turn are more orthodox than their counterparts
in the UK.
For the regression analysis we again used the same three specications
of the basic model used for the numerical questions (see section 4.4). Two
separate regressions were run in each case: for 7, the probability of the
respondent giving the strict orthodox response,and for 07, the probability of
the respondent giving the fuzzy orthodox response. The combined results are
presented in Table 10. It is immediate that the choice of specication I, II
or III makes very little di¤erence here: none of the specic avour dummies
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sex 0.0245 0.0096 0.0342 0.0185 0.0352 0.0180
age 0.0191 0.0231z 0.0187 0.0228z 0.0189 0.0230z
emp 0.0270 0.0187 0.0147 0.0036 0.0215 0.0104
pol -0.0129 -0.0291 -0.0155 -0.0318 -0.0219 -0.0401
ssecon -0.1050 -0.1086
ssbroad -0.0916 -0.0936
inc 10 -0.0423 -0.0451 -0.0279 -0.0313 -0.0268 -0.0301
inc+10 0.0278 0.0291 0.0137 0.0157 0.0128 0.0148
negform 0.0445 0.0132 0.0399 0.0096
ukd -0.0264 0.0238y -0.0149 0.0251 -0.0367 0.0024







const -1.2627 -1.1251 -1.2343 -1.0975 -1.2850 -1.1288
y signicant at 10% level; z signicant at 5% level; signicant at 1% level.
Table 10: Responses to verbal question: e¤ects of personal characteristics
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is signicant, nor is either version of the special subject dummy and the size
of the estimates on the other coe¢ cients is similar across each specication.
What is noticeable is that there is a role for age in the 07 regression and
an important role for the country dummies  bearing out the provisional
conclusions reached from the cross-tabulations.
5 Conclusions
We asked whether distributional orderings have the right shape. As we
have discussed, the question can be posed more precisely as: Do the rank-
ings implied in individualsperceptions of income distribution conform to
the standard approaches to a broad class of economic problems? The short
answer would appear to be no: across all seven avours of the study com-
paratively few respondents give numerical or verbal answers that t with the
orthodoxposition. In this respect the principle of MPS does indeed appear
to be overly strongas we mentioned on page 3. However, there is more to
be said: three features of the structure of responses are particularly striking.
First, the positions of the worst-o¤ and of the best-o¤ always appear to
be focal points. The questions that have implied transfers involving these
extremes (Q2 and Q5) elicit similar responses across all seven avours and
these questions often attract a much higher proportion of orthodox reponses
than other numerical questions. What is remarkable is the low degree of
variation among the six di¤erent questions in the Risk and Risk-i avours:
it may be that these two avours are conceptually speaking the hardest to
evaluate or in connection to risk, small transfers, independent of where they
occur, are not su¢ cient enough to change the evaluation of the respondents.
In terms of the verbal approach to the issue, whatever the avour, no more
than 20% support for the orthodox position is universally observed; on the
other hand, again across all the avours, it is interesting to note the relative
high support for the redistribution involving the extremes position (25-
30%).
The second point concerns a class of avours or contexts. As far as the
numerical questions are concerned there is evidently much greater conformity
with the standard view on the transfer principle if the context of the question
is a positive(welfare, justice) rather than a negative(inequality). This
conclusion comes through strongly both from Table 3 and from the role of
the dummy negform in the regression analysis.
Third, there is another clear avour di¤erence. Involvementplays a role
in peoples answers even though this involvement is purely conjectural as no-
one actually gets paid (or pays) anything. This is especially clear in the case
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of welfare where there is a greater degree of conformity with the conventional
view if one is not notionally involved in the distributional alternatives (Hars)
than if one is (Hars-i). This is true for each of the numerical questions taken
separately and for the verbal question see Tables 3 and 9. The results are
not as clear-cut for risk, although in nearly every case Risk elicits a greater
degree of conformity than Risk-i.
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Following are two of the seven questionnaires (avours Risk and Hars-i) that
were distributed to each of the response groups. The wording of the other ve
avours can be inferred from the description in section 3 and are also found
on http://darp.lse.ac.uk/7avors/ As explained in the text the experiment
was run so that each respondent had approximately an equal probability of
receiving any one of the seven questionnaires.
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R4   17 Feb. 03 
RISK QUESTIONNAIRE 
This questionnaire concerns people's attitude to risk. We would be interested in your 
view, based on hypothetical situations. Because it is about attitudes there are no "right" 
answers. Some of the possible answers correspond to assumptions consciously made by 
economists: but these assumptions may not be good ones.   Your responses will help to 
shed some light on this, and we would like to thank you for your participation. The 
questionnaire is anonymous.  
 
Alfaland consists of five regions that are identical in every respect other than the 
incomes of their inhabitants. Everyone within a given region receives the same 
income, but personal incomes differ from region to region. An immigrant to 
Alfaland would be assigned at random, with equal probability, to any one of these 
five regions.  Such a person would therefore have a 20% chance of being on any 
one of five income levels.  
Two economic policy proposals A and B are being considered for implementation 
in Alfaland next year. It is known that ─ apart from their impact on personal 
incomes ─ the two policies would have the same effect on the population. The 
impact upon the regions’ incomes would depend upon the particular state of the 
Alfaland economy at the time the policy (A or B) is to be introduced. 
In each of questions (1) to (6) two alternative lists of incomes A and B (in Alfaland 
local currency) are given. Each of these pairs represents the outcomes of the A-
policy and the B-policy on the five regions in each of six different situations in 
which Alfaland might find itself next year. In each case please state which policy 
you consider would result in higher risk for a person immigrating to Alfaland by 
circling A or B. If you consider that the two policies will result in the same risk to a 
potential immigrant then circle both A and B. 
 
 1) A = (2, 5, 9, 20, 30) B = (2, 6, 8, 20, 30) 
 
 2) A = (2, 5, 9, 20, 30) B = (3, 5, 9, 20, 29)  
 
 3) A = (2, 5, 9, 20, 30) B = (2, 6, 9, 20, 29) 
 
 4) A = (2, 5, 9, 20, 30) B = (2, 10, 9, 15, 30) 
 
 5) A = (10, 10, 10, 10, 30) B = (10, 10, 10, 20, 20) 
 
 6) A = (2, 5, 9, 20, 30) B = (2, 6, 9, 19, 30)  
 
 \...Continued 
R4   17 Feb. 03 
In question 7 you are presented with a hypothetical income change and some possible 
views about the effects on risk of that change. The views are labelled a),..., e).  Please 
circle the letter alongside the view that corresponds most closely to your own. You can 
check more than one answer, provided that you consider they do not contradict each 
other. Feel free to add any comment that explains the reason for your choice. 
 
7) Suppose we transfer income from the inhabitants of a relatively high-income region 
to those of a relatively low-income region, without changing the income of any other 
region. The transfer is not so large as to make the “rich” region “poor” and the 
“poor” region “rich”, but it may alter their income rankings relative to the other, 
unaffected regions. 
a) Risk for a potential immigrant to Alfaland must fall if the ranking by income of all 
the regions remains the same. If there is any change in the income ranking of the 
regions then it is possible that risk increases or remains the same. 
b) If the transfer is from the richest to the poorest region, and after the transfer the 
richest region remains the richest and the poorest remains the poorest, risk must 
fall. In other cases we cannot say a priori how risk will change. 
c) The transfer may change the relative position of other regions. So we cannot say a 
priori how risk will change. 
d) Risk for a potential immigrant to Alfaland must fall, even if there is a change in 
the income ranking of the regions as a result of this transfer, and even if the 
transfer is not from the richest region to the poorest. 
e) None of the above 
 
In the light of your answer to question 7, would you want to change your answers to 
questions 1 to 6? If so, please state your new response here. 
1) 2) 3) 
4) 5) 6) 
 
Finally, we would be grateful for some information about yourself: 
• Are you male or female? M/F 
• What is your age?  _____ years 
• What is your special subject of study? __________ 
• Were you employed before university? Yes / No 
 
 
• How would you rate your political views? Please 
put a √ on this scale. 
• How would you rate your family’s income 10 
years ago? Please put a √ on this scale. 
• How would you rate your own income prospects 

















B4H2  17 Feb. 03 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION QUESTIONNAIRE 
This questionnaire concerns people's attitude to income distribution. We would be 
interested in your view, based on hypothetical situations. Because it is about attitudes 
there are no "right" answers. Some of the possible answers correspond to assumptions 
consciously made by economists: but these assumptions may not be good ones.   Your 
responses will help to shed some light on this, and we would like to thank you for your 
participation. The questionnaire is anonymous.  
 
Alfaland consists of five regions that are identical in every respect other than the 
incomes of their inhabitants. Everyone within a given region receives the same 
income, but personal incomes differ from region to region.  
Two economic policy proposals A and B are being considered for implementation 
in Alfaland next year. It is known that ─ apart from their impact on personal 
incomes ─ the two policies would have the same effect on the population. The 
impact upon the regions’ incomes would depend upon the particular state of the 
Alfaland economy at the time the policy (A or B) is to be introduced. 
In each of questions (1) to (6) two alternative lists of incomes A and B (in Alfaland 
local currency) are given. Each of these pairs represents the outcomes of the A-
policy and the B-policy on the five regions in each of six different situations in 
which Alfaland might find itself next year. Imagine that you have been assigned to 
one of the regions in Alfaland with an equal chance of being in any one of the five 
regions. In each case please state which policy you consider would result in a better 
situation in Alfaland by circling A or B. If you consider that the two policies will 
result in an equivalent situation then circle both A and B.  
 
 1) A = (2, 5, 9, 20, 30) B = (2, 6, 8, 20, 30) 
 
 2) A = (2, 5, 9, 20, 30) B = (3, 5, 9, 20, 29)  
 
 3) A = (2, 5, 9, 20, 30) B = (2, 6, 9, 20, 29) 
 
 4) A = (2, 5, 9, 20, 30) B = (2, 10, 9, 15, 30) 
 
 5) A = (10, 10, 10, 10, 30) B = (10, 10, 10, 20, 20) 
 
 6) A = (2, 5, 9, 20, 30) B = (2, 6, 9, 19, 30)  
 
 \...Continued 
B4H2  17 Feb. 03 
In question 7 you are presented with a hypothetical income change and some possible 
views about the effects on income distribution of that change. The views are labelled 
a),..., e). Please circle the letter alongside the view that corresponds most closely to your 
own. You can check more than one answer, provided that you consider they do not 
contradict each other. Feel free to add any comment that explains the reason for your 
choice. 
7)  Suppose income is transferred from the inhabitants of a relatively high-income 
region to those of a relatively low-income region, without changing the income of 
any other region. The transfer is not so large as to make the “rich” region “poor” and 
the “poor” region “rich”, but it may alter their income rankings relative to the other, 
unaffected regions. 
a) The situation in Alfaland must improve if the ranking by income of all the regions 
remains the same. If there is any change in the income ranking of the regions then 
it is possible that the situation worsens or remains unaltered. 
b) If the transfer is from the richest to the poorest region, and after the transfer the 
richest region remains the richest and the poorest remains the poorest the 
situation must improve. In other cases it is impossible to say a priori how the 
situation will change. 
c) The transfer may change the relative position of other regions. So it is impossible 
to say a priori how the situation will change. 
d) The situation in Alfaland must improve, even if there is a change in the income 
ranking of the regions as a result of this transfer, and even if the transfer is not 
from the richest region to the poorest. 
e) None of the above 
 
In the light of your answer to question 7, would you want to change your answers to 
questions 1 to 6? If so, please state your new response here. 
1) 2) 3) 
4) 5) 6) 
 
Finally, we would be grateful for some information about yourself: 
• Are you male or female? M/F 
• What is your age?  _____ years 
• What is your special subject of study? __________ 
• Were you employed before university? Yes / No 
 
 
• How would you rate your political views? Please 
put a √ on this scale. 
• How would you rate your family’s income 10 
years ago? Please put a √ on this scale. 
• How would you rate your own income prospects 


















Respondents were asked about seven background variables and, in addition,
we had information about the particular subsample in which they were in-
cluded from the location of the experiment. Of the seven two were binary 
Are you male or female?, Were you employed before University? and
one was numerical What is your age?; these are all self-explanatory.
Viewpoint questions were based on a seven-point scale as depicted at the
end of each questionnaire in Appendix A.
Individuals wrote their own unguided response to What is your special
subject of study? unless they were in a class where the subject was homoge-
nous. Given that the study of economics could be argued to play a role in


























 an analysis of non-response (Table 11),
 a breakdown of orthodox responses by sex and involvement (Table 12),
 a breakdown of orthodox responses by country and avour (Table 13),
 a breakdown of orthodox responses on risk and on welfare by sex, in-
volvement and country (Table 14).
By avour By question
Ineq 1.3% Q1 1.6%
Hars 0.7% Q2 1.2%
Hars-i 0.8% Q3 1.4%
Fair 1.2% Q4 1.9%
Just 1.8% Q5 1.2%
Risk 1.8% Q6 1.7%
Risk-i 2.8%
calculated as nblanks=6N
for all avours combined
Table 11: Proportion of blank responses
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 joint Q1-Q6
Risk: Males
Non-involved 44.4% 66.7% 59.3% 60.5% 65.4% 58.0% 18.5%
Involved 42.3% 53.5% 50.7% 46.5% 62.0% 43.7% 11.3%
Risk: Females
Non-involved 37.7% 45.3% 54.7% 49.1% 50.9% 35.8% 9.4%
Involved 46.0% 55.6% 52.4% 50.8% 52.4% 41.3% 14.3%
Welfare: Males
Non-involved 63.2% 81.6% 72.4% 61.8% 85.5% 61.8% 27.6%
Involved 51.2% 74.4% 70.7% 64.6% 81.7% 56.1% 28.0%
Welfare: Females
Non-involved 54.8% 79.0% 72.6% 59.7% 74.2% 51.6% 25.8%
Involved 60.9% 84.4% 59.4% 45.3% 70.3% 50.0% 20.3%
Note: In each case the gure is the percentage of orthodox responses
Table 12: Orthodox responses: involvement versus non-involvement by sex
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joint average joint
N Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q1-Q6 Q1-Q6 Q1-Q7
Germany
Ineq 47 46.8% 78.7% 66.0% 53.2% 85.1% 51.1% 17.0% 63.5% 6.4%
Risk 48 39.6% 56.3% 50.0% 54.2% 60.4% 50.0% 16.7% 51.7% 6.3%
Risk-i 44 40.9% 56.8% 50.0% 50.0% 70.5% 43.2% 15.9% 51.9% 6.8%
Hars 48 64.6% 77.1% 77.1% 62.5% 87.5% 60.4% 29.2% 71.5% 6.3%
Hars-i 52 53.8% 73.1% 51.9% 46.2% 80.8% 44.2% 17.3% 58.3% 0.0%
Just 52 61.5% 84.6% 75.0% 67.3% 65.4% 76.9% 26.9% 71.8% 5.8%
Fair 53 56.6% 77.4% 69.8% 58.5% 73.6% 47.2% 28.3% 63.8% 7.5%
All 344 52.3% 72.4% 63.1% 56.1% 74.7% 53.5% 21.8% 62.0% 5.5%
Israel
Ineq 52 32.7% 75.0% 55.8% 57.7% 71.2% 44.2% 7.7% 56.1% 3.8%
Risk 52 48.1% 55.8% 57.7% 55.8% 57.7% 44.2% 15.4% 53.2% 0.0%
Risk-i 51 43.1% 56.9% 56.9% 43.1% 58.8% 43.1% 13.7% 50.3% 3.9%
Hars 50 48.0% 82.0% 64.0% 48.0% 74.0% 44.0% 18.0% 60.0% 8.0%
Hars-i 53 56.6% 92.5% 79.2% 66.0% 81.1% 62.3% 28.3% 73.0% 11.3%
Just 54 59.3% 98.1% 87.0% 63.0% 88.9% 81.5% 38.9% 79.6% 11.1%
Fair 50 50.0% 94.0% 84.0% 62.0% 74.0% 68.0% 22.0% 72.0% 4.0%
All 362 48.3% 79.3% 69.3% 56.6% 72.4% 55.5% 20.7% 63.6% 6.1%
UK
Ineq 44 34.1% 59.1% 56.8% 61.4% 63.6% 43.2% 20.5% 53.0% 4.5%
Risk 40 35.0% 62.5% 65.0% 60.0% 55.0% 52.5% 10.0% 55.0% 2.5%
Risk-i 47 40.4% 51.1% 44.7% 51.1% 42.6% 40.4% 6.4% 45.0% 2.1%
Hars 43 65.1% 83.7% 76.7% 74.4% 81.4% 65.1% 32.6% 74.4% 7.0%
Hars-i 44 54.5% 68.2% 65.9% 59.1% 65.9% 54.5% 29.5% 61.4% 13.6%
Just 45 62.2% 84.4% 73.3% 57.8% 77.8% 68.9% 31.1% 70.7% 8.9%
Fair 46 47.8% 80.4% 60.9% 63.0% 76.1% 60.9% 28.3% 64.9% 6.5%
All 309 48.5% 69.9% 63.1% 60.8% 66.0% 55.0% 22.7% 60.6% 6.5%
Note: In each case the gure is the percentage of orthodox responses
Table 13: Results by country: orthodox responses
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6
Risk: Males
Germany Non-involved 31 48.4% 61.3% 51.6% 64.5% 67.7% 58.1%
Involved 31 37.9% 62.1% 55.2% 48.3% 69.0% 44.8%
Israel Non-involved 26 42.3% 61.5% 53.8% 50.0% 69.2% 50.0%
Involved 18 44.4% 44.4% 55.6% 44.4% 72.2% 38.9%
UK Non-involved 24 41.7% 79.2% 75.0% 66.7% 58.3% 66.7%
Involved 24 45.8% 50.0% 41.7% 45.8% 45.8% 45.8%
Risk: Females
Germany Non-involved 17 23.5% 47.1% 47.1% 35.3% 47.1% 35.3%
Involved 15 46.7% 46.7% 40.0% 53.3% 73.3% 40.0%
Israel Non-involved 22 59.1% 50.0% 63.6% 59.1% 50.0% 40.9%
Involved 26 53.8% 61.5% 61.5% 42.3% 50.0% 46.2%
UK Non-involved 14 21.4% 35.7% 50.0% 50.0% 57.1% 28.6%
Involved 22 36.4% 54.5% 50.0% 59.1% 40.9% 36.4%
Welfare: Males
Germany Non-involved 29 74.2% 80.6% 80.6% 64.5% 93.5% 74.2%
Involved 28 46.4% 67.9% 57.1% 53.6% 85.7% 39.3%
Israel Non-involved 21 47.6% 85.7% 61.9% 52.4% 81.0% 42.9%
Involved 24 50.0% 91.7% 83.3% 75.0% 87.5% 70.8%
UK Non-involved 24 62.5% 79.2% 70.8% 66.7% 79.2% 62.5%
Involved 30 56.7% 66.7% 73.3% 66.7% 73.3% 60.0%
Welfare: Females
Germany Non-involved 17 47.1% 70.6% 70.6% 58.8% 76.5% 35.3%
Involved 24 62.5% 79.2% 45.8% 37.5% 75.0% 50.0%
Israel Non-involved 27 48.1% 77.8% 66.7% 44.4% 66.7% 48.1%
Involved 27 63.0% 96.3% 77.8% 55.6% 77.8% 55.6%
UK Non-involved 18 72.2% 88.9% 83.3% 83.3% 83.3% 72.2%
Involved 13 53.8% 69.2% 46.2% 38.5% 46.2% 38.5%
Note: In each case the gure is the percentage of orthodox responses
Table 14: Orthodox responses: involvement versus non-involvement; by
avour and country subgroup
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